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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah R. App. Pro., and Section 78-2-
2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. It arises out of a 
final judgment entered by the trial court dated September 19, 
2006. Notice of Appeal was filed on October 19, 2006. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR, AND STANDARD OF, REVIEW 
Appellant Aurora believes this case presents the 
following issues for review to be determined under the 
accompanying standards of review: 
1. Whether the trial court erred, under the undisputed facts 
herein, in awarding trial court costs to defendants by entering a 
new "final judgment' on September 19, 2 006, when the actual final 
judgment following which costs could be awarded under R. 54(d), 
Utah R. Civ. Pro., was entered on or about July 13, 2004. 
STANDARD: Correction of error, no deference. Lyon v. Burton, 5 
P.3d 616, 637 (Utah 2000). 
RECORD CITATION: R. 3399-3404. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award Aurora 
sanctions under Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. Pro., including reasonable 
attorney fees, against defendants' and/or their counsel for 
seeking said trial court cost award when it was clearly barred 
under the express provisions of Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. Pro.,and 
all cases interpreting said cost rule. 
STANDARD: Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 
11 is a question of law, under a correction of error, no 
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deference standard. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) 
RECORD CITATION: R. 3399-3404. 
3. Whether the appellate court should impose further 
sanctions against defendants and/or their counsel under Rules 33, 
34 and 40, Utah R. App. Pro., for necessitating Aurora's pursuit 
of this appeal of the trial court's clearly erroneous award of 
trial costs. 
STANDARD: As these rules are functionally similar to Rule 11, 
Utah R. Civ. Pro., the standard should also be a question of law. 
Jeschke v. Willis, supra; Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, supra. 
RECORD CITATION: N/A. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The issues on appeal are governed by: 
(A) Issue # 1, above, is determined by the express language of 
Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. Pro., and the cases interpreting said 
rule, including Lvon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616, 637 (Utah 2000); 
(B) Issue # 2, above, is determined by Rule 11(b), Utah R. Civ. 
Pro., and cases or legal authorities interpreting said rule; 
(C) Issue # 3, above, will be governed by Rules 33, 34, and 40, 
Utah R. App. Pro., and the defendants' actions in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is solely about the propriety of the trial 
court's entry of a new "final judgment" herein for the express 
purpose of allowing defendants to seek an award of trial court 
costs which, under the express terms of Rule 54(d) and cases 
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interpreting it, was barred because it was clearly untimely and 
was required to have been requested within five days of the entry 
of the true "final judgment" herein on July 13, 2004. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 13, 2004, the trial court entered its final judgment 
dismissing Aurora's claims with prejudice for purported 
violations of a discovery order. R. 3276-79. Defendants at that 
time made no attempts to seek recovery of their trial court 
costs. Following the appeal affirming that final judgment, the 
case was remitted to the trial court on June 6, 2006. R. 3350-58. 
On June 19, 2006, defendants filed their Verified Bill of Costs 
on Appeal. R. 3364-67. Also on June 19, 2006, defendants filed a 
Motion for Entry of Final Judgment, R. 3372-94, along with a 
Verified Memorandum of Costs, R.3368-71, seeking an award of 
costs allegedly incurred for trial court activity prior to the 
entry of the judgment of July 13, 2 004. On June 25, 2 006, Aurora 
filed its Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion for Entry of 
Final Judgment, and Request for Sanctions (Motion to tax bill of 
costs, R. 54). R. 3399-3404. On July 6, 2006, defendants filed 
their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Final 
Judgment and Opposition to Request for Sanctions, and on July 17, 
2006, Aurora filed its Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Memo 
Opposing Motion to Tax Bill of Costs and for Sanctions. [For some 
reason, these last two filings are not in the record on appeal. 
Aurora has therefore included copies of these filings in the 
Addendum.] On September 19, 2006, the trial court, without 
comment, signed and entered defendants' submitted "Final 
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Judgment" which awarded all of defendants' requested trial court 
costs. On October 19, 2006, Aurora filed its Notice of Appeal, 
appealing only the trial court's award of trial court costs and 
its refusal to award Rule 11 sanctions against defendants. R. 
3416-18. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in awarding defendants their trial 
court costs because under the express terms of R. 54(d), Utah R. 
Civ. Pro., and cases interpreting said rule, the verified 
Memorandum of Costs of the prevailing party must be filed within 
five days of the entry of the judgment which was final for 
purposes of appeal. This was the judgment of the trial court 
entered on July 13, 2004, yet defendants did not file such 
memorandum until June 19, 2 006, almost two years after it was 
time-barred under Rule 54(d) (2) . 
The trial court further erred in failing to award Rule 11 
sanctions against defendants and in favor of Aurora because it is 
apparent from the numerous decisions of Utah courts that 
defendants' request for trial costs at such a late date was 
frivolous, that any reasonable inquiry by defense counsel would 
have turned up the uniform rejection of untimely cost awards 
memoranda, and defendants' failure to even acknowledge, let alone 
attempt to distinguish, the overwhelming decisional authority 
rejecting defendants7 untimely request for trial costs. 
Finally, assuming defendants will continue to assert their 
frivolous argument that Rule 54(d) actually expects costs awards 
to be sought after completion of the appeal, the Court should 
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impose appropriate sanctions against defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF TRIAL COSTS ON SEPTEMBER 19, 2 006, 
WHEN THE RULE 54(d) FINAL JUDGMENT HEREIN WAS ENTERED ON 
JULY 13, 2 004, IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
AND MUST BE REVERSED 
The trial court's award of trial court costs to defendants 
over two years after the entry of final judgment herein is 
clearly erroneous and must be reversed. The trial court's final 
judgment herein pursuant to Rule 54, Utah R. Civ. Pro., was 
entered on July 13, 2 004, dismissing Aurora's claims as a 
sanction for purported violations of a discovery order. Under the 
express provisions of Rule 54(d)(2), defendants were required to 
file their verified cost memorandum within five days of this July 
13, 2004 Order in order to recover trial costs or be barred from 
recovering those costs. Instead, defendants waited until after 
Aurora's appeal of the July 13, 2 004, final judgment to attempt 
to recover their trial costs by filing a motion for the court to 
enter a new final judgment for the express purpose of allowing 
them to be awarded their clearly untimely cost request. 
The language of Rule 54(d)(2) cannot be more clear as to 
what is required of a party who seeks to recover their costs 
incurred in obtaining the judgment: 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs 
must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon 
the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of 
a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to the 
affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the 
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action 
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or proceeding 
Rule 54(d)(2), Utah R. Civ. Pro. Obviously, the rule provides for 
filing and serving the cost memo within five days of the entry of 
the judgment ready for appeal. It does not provide for an award 
pursuant to a motion seeking a new judgment for the sole purpose 
of asking for a cost award which is plainly untimely, two years 
after the final judgment defined in Rule 54(a). 
This five-day time limit has been strictly construed by 
Utah's courts. If the required memorandum is not filed within 
five days of entry of the judgment, any cost award is barred. 
Lyon v. Burton, Utah 2000, 5 P.3d 616, 637 (failure to file the 
verified memorandum of costs within five days of the judgment 
prevents the award of costs); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. N.Y. 
Terminal Warehouse Co., Utah 1960, 350 P.2d 626, 630-31 (failure 
to timely file is fatal to recovery of costs); Brown v. 
Jorgensen, Utah Ct. App. 2006, 136 P.3d 1252, 1259 (costs are 
allowed only if the requisite memorandum is filed within five 
days of the judgment). 
The requirement of filing the cost memorandum within five 
days of the entry of the judgment has been described by Utah's 
courts as a "well-established" blanket rule. In re Sheville, Utah 
Ct. App. 2003, 71 P.3d 179, 181. Further, the five-day 
requirement's mandatory language leaves no discretion to the 
trial court. Lyon v. Burton, supra at p. 637; Ault v. Holden, 
Utah 2002, 44 P.3d 781, 793. Thus, defendants' clearly untimely 
attempt to resuscitate the cost award by asking the trial court 
to simply enter a new "final judgment" is thoroughly rejected by 
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the express language of Rule 54(d) and all Utah cases addressing 
the issue of the procedure to obtain a cost award. 
Defendants' only argument to the trial court was that the 
simple phrase in Rule 54(d)(1), "..., provided, however, where an 
appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the 
action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other 
proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause ", means that seeking the cost award after the appeal 
is complete is perfectly appropriate. Of course, such a 
suggestion is patently absurd, and the phrase cited by defendants 
in defense of their untimely cost request quite obviously means 
merely that should an appellate court determine that the trial 
court's judgment must be modified or reversed, the cost award, if 
affected, must be altered, amended or stricken to conform to the 
appellate decision. 
Defendants' reliance on the "shall abide" language in R. 
54(d)(1) is completely unfounded, unsupported by any decision and 
is contrary to well-settled principles of statutory construction. 
First, the phrase is within the subsection of the rule providing 
to whom the cost award may be awarded, not the subsection 
establishing the procedure by which the award is to be assessed. 
Second, under the usual meaning of the words, a caution that 
where an appeal is pursued, the cost award "shall abide the final 
determination of the cause" presumes the prior existence of an 
award which must "abide" the final determination. Furthermore, 
adopting defendants' strained argument (that this simple phrase 
means it is perfectly proper to wait until after appeals are 
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finished to file for costs) results in the complete evisceration 
of the very specific language of R. 54(d)(2) as to the procedure 
for seeking an award of costs at trial. This clearly would 
violate the accepted principle of construction that a court has a 
duty to avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that renders 
portions of the statute, or related statutes, meaningless. Lyon 
v. Burton, supra at p.62 3 n.5. Defendants' suggestion that their 
interpretation of Rule 54(d) would conserve judicial time and 
resources can hardly be recalled with a straight face. If the 
need for a separate appeal over a cost award sounds like 
something which the appellate courts of this state would welcome 
on a regular basis, then defendants' argument would make sense. 
But, as this is not something courts would welcome, by any 
rationale, it is completely frivolous. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING RULE 11 
SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTS BECAUSE DEFENDANTS' 
ARGUMENTS WERE FRIVOLOUS AND NOT SUPPORTED 
BY ANY LEGAL AUTHORITY 
The trial court herein erred not only by actually granting 
defendants their cost award in contravention of well-established 
legal authority, but also erred in failing to award Aurora its 
reasonable attorney fees in having to oppose defendants7 motion 
for the cost award as a sanction under Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. 
Pro., or other authority such as Section 78-27-56, Utah Code 
Ann., or the court's inherent power. 
Rule 11 provides, in relevant part: 
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting a pleading, 
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written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by 
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an 
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the 
best of the persons knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions 
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law; ... . 
R. 11, Utah R. Civ. Pro. It is quite apparent that defendants and 
their counsel sought the cost award in violation of part (2) of 
subsection (b) of Rule 11. 
First, defendants' counsel made no argument whatsoever to 
the trial court for any extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, but only argued that defendants' cost award request 
was, in fact, warranted by existing law. The sole argument of 
defendants was that, in spite of all the cases cited by Aurora 
demonstrating their cost award request was untimely and therefore 
barred under the provisions of Rule 54(d)(2), the single phrase 
found in R. 54(d)(1) about the award "abiding" the final 
determination of the cause in the event of an appeal should allow 
defendants to seek the cost award after the appellate process is 
completed. As seen above in Point I, this suggestion by 
defendants is patently absurd because it results in the complete 
abrogation of the express terms of R. 54(d)(2) which sets out the 
procedure by which a cost award must be sought, and is also at 
odds with the statutory scheme governing judgments, cost awards 
and filing appeals which clearly establish a time schedule in 
which to perform these tasks without need for a separate appeal 
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process over a cost award. 
One treatise has suggested that courts consider the 
following factors in judging whether a paper is truly warranted 
by a nonfrivolous argument for a change in law: 
1. whether the presenter has offered arguments in support of 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; 
2. the legal sufficiency and plausibility of those 
arguments; 
3. the creativity, novelty, or innovativeness of those 
arguments; 
4. any other objective indication that the presenter sought 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; 
5. the candor and adequacy of the discussion of existing 
law, including adverse precedent; 
6. the clarity or ambiguity of existing law; 
7. the nature of the case, including whether constitutional 
doctrines are implicated; and 
8. the danger of chilling either (i) the enthusiasm or 
creativity of counsel or (ii) reasonable efforts to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 
Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse (3d ed. 
2000 at § 12(B)). Factor # 7 is not relevant because no 
constitutional doctrines are involved in this case. All other 
factors militate against the position of defendants: As to factor 
# 1, defendants did not make any argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, instead arguing that 
their position was merited under existing law; as to factor #s 2 
& 3, as seen above, the position of defendants would eviscerate 
the current provisions of Rule 54(d)(2) as to how procedurally to 
obtain a cost award; as to factor # 4, defendants made no attempt 
to seek any change in the law, but only asserted that existing 
law supported their position in spite of being unable to cite any 
legal authority to back up their claim; as to factor # 5, this 
severely goes against defendants since they completely failed to 
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cite or address in any way the numerous decisions holding 
adversely to their position; and, as to factor #6, the 
requirement of filing the cost memorandum within five days of the 
entry of the underlying judgment has been described as "well-
established" law by the Utah appellate courts. 
The 1993 Advisory Committee Note states that "although 
arguments for a change of law are not required to be specifically 
so identified, a contention that is so identified should be 
viewed with greater tolerance under the rule" (Appendix F). 
However, as shown above, defendants made no acknowledgment of 
existing case law on this issue in the trial court. Courts 
uniformly find that the issue of compliance with Rule 11 
certification requirements is to be judged on an objective basis, 
to eliminate any "empty-head pure-heart" justification for 
patently frivolous arguments. This objective standard is derived, 
at least in part, from the rule's "reasonable inquiry" language. 
It is difficult to immagine what kind of reasonable inquiry 
defendants' counsel could have made without discovering the 
fairly voluminous caselaw in Utah dealing precisely with the 
questions of how and when a cost award must be sought. The cases 
cited by Aurora holding adversely to defendants' position were 
easily found in the annotation notes following the text of Rule 
11 or by shepardizing those cited in the annotations. Thus, it is 
impossible to believe that defense counsel was not aware of the 
overwhelming authority against their position. One must instead 
conclude that defendants' intent was certainly to mislead the 
trial court. As one court has stated, "Distortion of the law is 
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'precisely the sort of creativity Rule 11 should chill.7" Gaiardo 
v. Ethyl Corp., 3d Cir. 1987, 835 F.2d 479, 484 (emphasis added). 
This conclusion is bolstered by the manner in which defendants 
sought the cost award. Having apparently noticed that Rule 
54(d)(2) requires that the verified memorandum of costs must be 
filed within five days of the trial court's final judgment 
dismissing Aurora's claims entered on July 13, 2 004, Aurora 
believes that any reasonable inquiry would have led defense 
counsel to the numerous cases holding that yes, the rule really 
did mean what it says. Instead, defendants went ahead and moved 
the court enter another, new "final judgment" just for the 
purpose of allowing them to file a clearly untimely cost 
memorandum. This action on the part of defendants' counsel 
supports the presumption that they did, in fact, know that their 
actions were contrary the express language of Rule 54(d) and the 
decisional authority interpreting said rule. 
Thus, any reasonable inquiry would have led defense counsel 
to the numerous decisions establishing that the five-day 
limitation following entry of judgment was hard and firm. 
Instead, defense counsel moved the trial court to enter a new 
judgment in order to award them their costs, and argued (without 
citing any authority) that the rule actually meant for this to be 
the appropriate course to pursue their costs. There really is no 
other conclusion to reach than that defendants' seeking a cost 
award two years after the final judgment as defined in Rule 54 
was not only frivolous under any objective standard, but was done 
in bad faith (though bad faith is not required to impose Rule 11 
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sanctions). The Court should find that defendants' violated Rule 
11(b) (2) by filing a motion to enter a new "final judgment" in 
order to seek a cost award that was clearly untimely and barred 
by the terms of Rule 54(d) and decisions interpreting said rule, 
and direct the trial court on remand to award Aurora its costs 
and reasonable attorney fees in amounts to be determined on 
remand. 
POINT III 
ASSUMING DEPENDANTS CONTINUE WITH THEIR 
FRIVOLOUS ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL, THE COURT SHOULD 
AWARD AURORA MULTIPLE COSTS AND SUCH 
OTHER SANCTIONS AS ARE PROPER 
Assuming that defendants continue with their frivolous 
argument that they not only can, but should, wait until after the 
completion of any appeal process before seeking their trial court 
costs, the Court will be in a position to sanction them for 
pursuing this frivolous argument, under Rules 33, 34, and 40, 
Utah R. App. Pro., and should do so on the basis that this 
argument of defendants is, and will continue to be, a frivolous 
argument. It is also clearly not a nonfrivolous argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law in that it 
is directly contrary to the express provisions of R. 54(d)(2) as 
to how to procedurally obtain a trial cost award, as well as that 
it would require an abandonment of the decisional authorities of 
Utah cases spanning over forty years. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court clearly erred in entering a new "final 
judgment" for the sole purpose of awarding defendants their trial 
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court costs more than two years after the deadline for doing so 
under the terms of Rule 54(d) and decisions interpreting that 
rule. 
The trial court further erred in not sanctioning defendants 
under Rule 11 for their frivolous argument for the cost award, 
since any reasonable inquiry into the meaning of the terms of 
Rule 54(d) would have revealed the numerous decisions rejecting 
defendants' position and setting a hard line against untimely 
cost memoranda. The Court should direct the trial court to award 
sanctions against defendants and in favor of Aurora for asserting 
their frivolous arguments in support of the cost award, awarding 
Aurora its costs and reasonable attorney fees in amounts to be 
determined on remand. 
Finally, the Court should award Aurora a multiple of its 
costs on appeal along with such other sanctions as may be 
appropriate should defendants continue their frivolous arguments 
on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of February, 2007. 
j#~/fL // fc4&^n*,^ 
Er ic P. Hatfrtman 
At torney for Aurora 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned attorney for appellant Aurora Credit 
Services, Inc., hereby certifies that he served defendants herein 
by depositing two true and correct copies of the above 
Appellant's Brief in the U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, 
on the 21stth day of February, 2007, addressed to the following: 
James E. Mag1eby 
Attorney for Defendants 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
S,*L ^ut^^ 
Eric P. Hartman 
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PERTINENT PORTIONS OF IMPORTANT RULES 
Rule 54(d): 
(d) Costs 
(d) (1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision 
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of 
the action, other than costs in connection with such an appeal or 
other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and 
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must 
within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of the 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements 
in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof 
duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are 
correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily 
incurred in the action or proceeding, A party dissatisfied with 
the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the 
memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs 
taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or 
at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of 
judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on 
the date judgment is entered. 
Rule 11(b)(1),(2): 
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting a 
pleading,written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by 
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the 
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions 
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law or the establishment of new law; ... . 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AURORA CREDIT SERVICES, INC., a 
Minnesota corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, XM 
INTERNATIONAL, LLC a Utah limited 
liability company, and DENNIS W. GAY, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY 
OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
and 
OPPOSITION TO REQUEST FOR 
SANCTIONS 
Civil No.: 940904935 
Honorable Leon A. Dever 
Defendants Liberty West Development, Inc., XM International, LLC and Dennis W. Gay 
(collectively, "Defendants") hereby submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Entry of Judgment and Opposition to Request for Sanctions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Aurora opposes Defendants' Motion for Entry of Final Judgment (the "Motion") on just 
two grounds. First, Aurora claims that a final judgment has already been entered such that 
Defendants' request for such a judgment is moot, and Defendants' submission of a memorandum 
of costs incurred at the trial court level untimely. Second, Aurora takes issue with the minimal 
amount of reasonable costs sought by Defendants, which include the costs for one deposition, for 
transcripts of two depositions taken by Aurora, and for a $15.00 copy of the transcript of the 
hearing at which this Court heard argument as to why Aurora should be sanctioned for discovery 
abuse. As discussed below, neither of these arguments has merit, and Defendants' Motion 
should be granted. Moreover, Aurora's baseless request for Rule 11 sanctions should be soundly 
rejected. 
I. ENTRY OF A FINAL JUDGMENT IS NECESSARY AND AP i \TE 
Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. ("Aurora") characterizes Defendants' Motion as a 
bad faith attempt to circumvent the provision of Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requiring the submission of a memorandum of costs within five days "after entry of judgment." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Aurora's characterization is inaccurate and inflammatory, and 
Defendants request the Court to reject Aurora's overly simplistic approach to the issues 
addressed in the Motion. 
While the Court's denial of Aurora's motion to alter or amend the Court's July 14, 2004 
Order of dismissal was "final" for purposes of initiating an appeal Rule 54(d)(1) indicates this 
kind of judgment is not "final" for purposes of awarding costs when the losing party appeals. In 
? 
fact, the plain language of Rule 54(d)(1) specifically provides that costs shall wail for the final 
determination of the case in the event of an appeal: 
[Cjosts shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for 
review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (emphasis added). When reading Rule 54(d)(2) in conjunction with 
Rule 54(d)(1), no other reasonable interpretation can be applied. To inteipret the rules otherwise 
would necessarily result in an illogical procedural waste of time - i.e. the prevailing party at trial 
obtains an award of costs only to have the award become meaningless in the event the appellate 
courts reverses the trial court's decision. Here, the Court of Appeals specifically remitted the 
case back to this Court, and Defendants have asked the Court to conclude this case by entry of a 
final judgment. At the same time, Defendants have asked this Court to include in that judgment 
the very costs on appeal awarded by the Utah Court of Appeals, the amount which is to be 
determined by this Court. It is this type of award and final judgment which is contemplated by 
the language of Rule 54(d)(1) that "shall abide the final determination" of costs on appeal. And, 
it is this Court's entry of Judgment on those costs which will constitute the final judgment in this 
matter. With the appeals now having been ruled upon, Defendants' memorandum of costs was 
timely filed, and Defendants* Motion should be granted. 
TI DEFENDANTS' COSTS ARE REASONABLE AND WERE NECESSARILV 
INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH DEVELOPING AND PRESENTING THE 
CASE 
Aurora argues that Defendants" costs set forth in their Verified Memorandum of Costs 
should be rejected because the depositions and transcript of a hearing involved were not 
necessary to the development of the case. 
Utah courts have held that, to recover costs of depositions, the Court must be persuaded 
that the depositions "were taken in good faith and, in light of the circumstances, appeared to be 
essential for the development and presentation of the case." Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, f 6, 16 
P.3d 549 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Here, the costs of 
each of the depositions and/or transcripts claimed by Defendants were not only reasonable but 
also necessary. [See generally Affidavit of James E. Magleby ("Magleby Aff."), attached as Exhibit "A"]. 
First, Aurora - not Defendants - noticed and took the depositions of both Dennis Gay and 
Delonna Anderson. Mr. Gay was a Defendant, and Ms. Anderson a former employee of 
Defendant XM International, LLC. [See Magleby Aff. 1) 4]. Defendants merely obtained transcripts 
of the depositions, which was obviously necessary for bringing and opposing dispositive motions 
and preparing these witnesses for trial. [See id.]. Moreover, contrary to Aurora's argument, the 
fact that the case was dismissed as a sanction for Aurora's discovery abuse does not affect the 
necessity for these transcripts. Up until the time of the dismissal for Aurora's discovery abuse, 
Defendants were clearly required to pursue their case with zeal, without relying upon any ruling 
they might have hoped to obtain. 
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Second, Defendants necessarily incurred the costs associated with two days of a 
deposition of Charles Zak (including the costs for recording his non-appearance for a scheduled 
deposition), a principal of Aurora and likely its chief witness. [See Magleby Aff K 5]. Indeed, the 
primary basis for the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in the first appeal of this matter was Mr. 
Zak's testimony. See Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev.t Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 
1998). The depositions were necessary to prepare the case for trial and to the preparation of 
dispositive motions in the case. [See Magleby Aff. \ 5]. Again, the dismissal of the case for 
Aurora's discovery abuse has no bearing on this issue. Accordingly, the costs are appropriate 
under Rule 54(d), and Defendants respectfully request an award of the same. 
Finally, an award of costs is also appropriate with respect to the $15.00 transcript of the 
hearing in which the Court considered the motion for sanctions against Aurora, which ultimately 
led to the Court's dismissal of Aurora's case. Not only was the transcript necessary to respond to 
Aurora's motion to "alter or amend" the trial court's entry of the sanction of dismissal, the 
transcript was also essential for purposes of responding to Aurora's appeal. [See Magleby Aff. H 6]. 
In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals referred to the transcript extensively in affirming this Court's 
dismissal of the case, underscoring the necessity of obtaining the transcript in the first place. See 
Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev 'p, Inc., 2006 UT App 48, H 1 0. 129 P.3d 287 
(attached to Motion as Exhibit wiA"j. In short, Defendants* costs are appropriate and should be 
awarded in full. 
II. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO BASIS FOR SANCTIONS 
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According to Aurora, Defendants' request for trial court costs is '"frivolous" and 
otherwise unsupported. Aurora's argument is off-mark, and is nothing short of vindictiveness 
against the prevailing party. Where an interpretation of the rule is even plausible - much less 
correct (as in this case) - sanctions cannot be awarded under Rule 11. See, e.g. Barnard v. Utah 
Slate Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993). In fact, to transgress Rule 11, the argument needs to be 
utterly meritless or objectively unreasonable; again, neither is the case here. See, e.g. Taylor v. 
Hansen, 958 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1998). 
As set forth above, Rule 54(d)(1) clearly provides that an award of costs "shall abide" the 
"final" determination of a case after an appeal is taken, as in this case. Thus, there is no 
justification for sanctions, and the Court should soundly reject Aurora's request for the same. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request the Court to enter a final 
judgment and award Defendants their requested costs. Defendants also ask the Court to deny 
Aurora's baseless request for sanctions. 
DATED this 6th day of July 2006. , 
MAGLEGB7 fc GREENWOOD, P.C. 
James E. Magleby 
Attorneys forXM International, LLC, 
Liberty West Development, Inc.. 
and Dennis W. Gay 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C., 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that pursuant to Rule 5(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
and OPPOSITION TO REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS was delivered to the following this 6th 
dayofJuly2006by: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Electronic Mail as indicated below 
Eric P. Hartman 
2558 South Wilshire Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Kenneth W. Yeates 
Samantha J. SI ark 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
170 South Main Street. Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
A Homey for Plaint iff A urora 
Credit Services, Inc. 
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Exhibit "A 
James E. Magleby (7247) 
Christine T. Greenwood (8187) 
Jason A. McNeill (9711) 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801.359.9000 
Facsimile: 801.359.9011 
Attorneys for XM International, LLC, Liberty 
West Development, Inc., and Dennis W. Gay 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AURORA CREDIT SERVICES, INC., a 
Minnesota corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, XM 
INTERNATIONAL, LLC a Utah limited 
liability company, and DENNIS W. GAY, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES E. 
MAGLEBY IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 940904935 
Honorable Leon A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, James E. Magleby, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age and have personal knowledge of the facts 
set forth in this affidavit. If called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the 
matters set forth herein. 
2. I am licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and have represented the 
Defendants in this matter since approximately October 2002. 
3. As set forth in the Verified Memorandum of Costs submitted by Defendants on 
June 19, 2006, the costs set forth therein were reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection 
with developing and presenting this case. 
4. More specifically, Defendants reasonably and necessarily spent $309.85 to obtain 
a copy of the transcript of a deposition of Dennis Gay taken by Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, 
Inc. ("Aurora"), and $114.30 to obtain a copy of the transcript of Delonna Anderson taken by 
Aurora. Dennis Gay is a Defendant, and.Delonna Anderson is a former employees of Defendant 
XM International, LLC, and the transcripts were necessary for bringing and opposing dispositive 
motions and preparing these witnesses for trial. 
5. The costs associated with two days of a deposition of Charles Zak (including the 
costs for recording his non-appearance for a scheduled deposition), a principal of Aurora and 
likely its chief witness, were also reasonable and necessary to the development and presentation 
of this case, including for trial preparation and drafting and opposing dispositive motions. 
Indeed, the primary basis for the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in the first appeal of this matter 
was Mr. Zak's testimony. See Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 
1273 (Utah 1998). 
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6. Defendants' payment of $15.00 for the transcript of the hearing at which the 
Court considered Defendants' motion for sanctions against Aurora for discovery abuse was also 
necessary. Not only was the transcript necessary to respond to Aurora's motion to "alter or 
amend" the trial court's ultimate entry of the sanction of dismissal, the transcript was also 
essential for purposes of responding to Aurora's appeal.] 
DATED this 6th day of July 2006. 
James E. Magleby 
tii SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this 6111 day of July 2006. 
[ S E A L ] 
fnAMrAslhd C^CVA 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MARVA ANDERSON ^ 
NOTARY PUBUC - STATE OF UTAH 
170 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CTnCUT 84101 
My Gomm. Exp. 10/(17/2007 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C, 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that pursuant to Rule 5(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
JAMES E. MAGLEBY IN SUPPO. F MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL 
JUDGMENT was delivered to the following this 6th day of July 2006 by: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Electronic Mail as indicated below 
Eric P. Hartman 
2558 South Wilshire Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Kenneth W. Yeates 
Samantha J. SI ark 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff Aurora 
Credit Services, Inc. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AURORA CREDIT SERVICES, INC-, 
a Minnesota corporation, on 
behalf of itself and all other 
shareholders of Liberty West 
Development, Inc., a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, XM INTER-
NATIONAL, a Utah limited 
liability company, and DENNIS 
W. r*^ -t- individual, 
Defendants, 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY 
TO DEFENDANTS' MEMO 
OPPOSING MOTION TO 
TAX BILL OF COSTS 
AND FOR SANCTIONS 
Il II l i i ' in J | ! Mi i i ; ] i"i \ 15 
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i c e s , • U L i : 
its counsel of record, Eric P. Hartman, submits the following 
Repl\ fo Defendants' Memo Opposing Plaintiff's Motion to Tax Bill 
.. 3 . 
Once again defendants have proffered an argument to the 
court without citation of any legal support for their position. 
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support defendants' position is most likely because there simply 
is no supporting case law or other authority. And again, when 
Aurora raises the fact that defendants have cited no support for 
their position, they respond with feigned outrage that anyone 
Cdiild snqrjcf-'t III I "I he emperor was wea"' j • • ' 1 I I , 
again, defendants have still cited absolutely no legal support 
for their proposition that their request for an award of costs is 
proper over eighteen months after it was required to be submitted 
under Rule 54, Utah R. Civ. Pro. 
Defendants' only argument is that certain language in 
the rule, that "where an appeal or other proceeding for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with 
such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final 
determination of the cause. ...", overrides the express provision 
that the cost bill must be filed "within five days after the 
entry of judgment... ." R. 54(d)(2), Utah R. Civ. Pro. Of course, 
the judgment referred to in the rule is that "from which an 
appeal lies." R. 54(a), not one which the party asks the court to 
enter after appeals have been pursued. And, of course, the 
language of Rule 54(d)(1) cited by defendants merely means that 
where costs have been awarded based on the trial court's original 
judgment, and that judgment is reversed on appeal, the cost award 
must be altered, amended or set aside if the underlying judgment 
is reversed on appeal, thus making it "abide" the final 
determination of the cause. 
The defendants' argument is seen as preposterous in 
that it clearly rewrites the substantive provisions of Rule 54. 
First, it abrogates the provision that the cost bill must be 
served and filed within five days of the judgment. Under 
defendants' proposed construction of the rule, a final judgment 
may be entered by a trial court, the prevailing party may not 
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file a cost bill until twenty days after such judgment, and such 
clearly untimely cost bill would be resurrected if an appeal is 
filed between twenty and thirty days after the entry of judgment. 
Utah's courts have rejected such argument. Lyon v Burton, Utah 
2000, 5 P.3d 616, 637; Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. N.Y. Terminal 
Warehouse Co., Utah 1960, 350 P.2d 626, 630-31; Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, Utah 1998, 961 P.2d 305, 318. 
Furthermore, defendants' construction would promote a 
practice which is clearly contrary to the scheme of the rules of 
civil procedure. A judgment under R. 54 is appealable within 
thirty days of its entry. Rule 54's requirement that the cost 
bill be filed within five days of the entry of judgment is a 
clear indication that issues arising out of the cost bill award 
or non-award are to be dealt with in the initial appeal. 
Obviously, should a party be able to circumvent the time 
requirements of R. 54 by being able to ask the court to enter a 
new judgment after appeals have been prosecuted, it would result 
in numerous secondary appeals over just the cost awards. Such a 
waste of time, money and judicial resources is clearly beyond the 
contemplation of the rules. Additionally, it certainly would have 
been a simple matter for the draftspersons of the rules to 
expressly provide for the trial court cost bill to be filed after 
appeals have been taken or deadlines passed. However, such is not 
the case, and the rules expressly set out the times for the cost 
bill and for an appeal to avoid any needless waste and 
duplication such as that urged by defendants. 
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Defendants' argument that their untimely request for 
trial costs is within the language of R. 54(d) is quite simply 
groundless. They have made no argument as to why the well-settled 
law on this issue should be modified or reversed, and is 
frivilous. Thus, sanctions under R. 11, Utah R. Civ. Pro., 
against defendants and in favor of plaintiff are appropriate. 
DATED this (*? day of July, 2 006. 
Eric P. tfartman 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing was served, on this /T^ day of 
July, 2006, by depositing in the U.S. mail, first-class postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
James E. Magleby 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Eric P. 
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